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Introduction
With the rapid growth of Internet technologies, the demand for Internet services explodes accordingly. Multi-server architecture has been widely used in our life since a single server cannot provide enough services. To guarantee secure communication in multi-server environments, authentication schemes have been widely studied.
Very recently, Shao et al. [1] proposed a dynamic IDbased remote user authentication scheme with access control for multi-server environment and claimed that it is immune to various attacks. In this paper, however, some security loopholes of their scheme will be pointed out and the corresponding attacks will be described.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Sect. 2, we give a brief review of Shao et al.'s scheme. Section 3 presents our attacks on Shao et al.'s scheme. Section 4 concludes the paper.
Review of Shao et al.'s Scheme
For convenience, notations used throughout the paper are summarized as follows: 
Registration Phase
There are two sub-phase in this phase. Both of them are described as follows.
Server registration: The service provider S j submits his identity S ID j to the registration center RC via secure channel. RC computes a secret number y j = h(h(x)||S ID j ) and sends it to S j via secure channel. S j keeps y j secretly after receiving it.
User registration: Before a user U i can access services, he must register in RC through the following steps.
1) U i submits his identity ID i and password PW i to RC via secure channel.
2) After receiving ID i and PW i , RC generates the curve polynomial F(L) [2] as access rights of U i and computes
, h(·)} into a smart card and issues it to U i via secure channel.
Login Phase
When U i wants to access S j , the following steps will be executed to verify U i 's legality.
1) U i inserts his smart card into a card reader and inputs
. Then the smart card checks whether H i and h(T * i ) are equal. If they are not equal, the smart card rejects the session.
3) The smart card generates a random number N i and computes y *
The smart card uses S ID j into polynomial F(L) to get the role value P and computes
5) The smart card sends the login request message
{C i , G i , Q i , P L , N i } to S j .
Authentication Phase
Upon receiving the login request message, U i and S j will Copyright c 2013 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers carry out the following steps to authenticate each other.
1) S j computes CID * i = G i ⊕ h(y j ||N i ) and P * = P L ⊕ h(y j ||N i ). Then S j checks whether C i and h(CID * i ||Q i ||P * ||N i ) are equal. If they are not equal, S j stops the session.
2) S j verifies Q i with every data h(T i ||N i ) stored in the blacklist of malicious users given by RC at track phase. When no match is found, S j rejects the login request.
3) S j generates a random number N j and computes 
Track Phase
On discovering a malicious user U i , S j collects the relevant data regarding U i and obtains U i 's real identity with the cooperation of RC.
1) S j sends CID i and N i to RC.
2) Upon receiving CID i and N i , RC computes ID i = CID i ⊕ h(h(x)||N i ) and T i = h(ID i ||x).
3) RC updates the blacklist of malicious users with T i and sends the latest version of the blacklist to all of servers.
Cryptanalysis of Shao et al.'s Scheme
Since all the message are transmitted in the public network, then we could assume that an adversary A completely control the communication channel between U i and S j , which means that he can insert, delete, or alter any messages in the channel. Besides, Kocher et al. [3] and Messerges et al. [4] have pointed out that all existent smart cards are vulnerable in that the confidential information stored in the device could be extracted by physically monitoring its power consumption. Then we could assume that all secrets in a card may be revealed once it is lost.
Shao et al. claimed that their scheme could resist various attacks. Basing on the above assumptions, we will demonstrate that Shao et al.'s scheme cannot withstand offline password guessing attack and stolen smart card attack.
Server Spoofing Attack
Let A be a malicious user. He could get a legal smart card from RC. ||x) . A could carry out the sever spoofing attack through the following steps.
1) A extracts R A , V A and H A from his smart card.
It is easy to say that the message {M 1 , N j } could pass the verification of U i since it is generated by S j 's secret key y j = h(h(x)||S ID j ). Therefore, Shao et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to the server spoofing attack.
Password Guessing Attack
Let U i be a legal user. We assume that U i 's smart card is lost and gotten by an adversary A. Then A could extract the confidential information R i = T i ⊕ h(x) ⊕ h(PW i ), V i = T i ⊕ h(ID i ||PW i ) and H i = h(T i ), stored in his smart card, where T i = h(ID i ||x). Using R i , V i and H i , A could get U i 's password PW i through the following steps.
1) A guesses a password PW * i and an identity ID * i .
A checks whether H i and h(T * i ) are equal. If they are equal, A finds the correct password. Otherwise, A repeats steps 1), 2) and 3) until the correct password is found.
In Shao et al.'s scheme, users could selects their passwords and identities freely. For convenience, they would like to choose human-memorable short strings as passwords and identities. Then, the size of two corresponding dictionaries of passwords and identities is very small. Therefore, our attack is feasible because both password and identity are not high-entropy keys. Besides, the attacker can probably deduce the user's identity when she gets the smart card. In that case, our attack can be done much more efficiently since she only needs to guess the password. This assumption is reasonable because the user often choose his name as his identity or write his identity on the card; and moreover the input identity is usually displayed in plain on the screen and thus can be possibly seen when the attacker steals the card [5] . Therefore, Shao et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to the password guessing attack.
Inability of Providing Anonymity
Shao et al. claimed that their scheme could provide anonymity. However, we will show a malicious user could get the real identity of user, who sends the login request message. Let A be a malicious user. He could get a legal smart card from RC. ||x) . A could get the real identity through the following steps.
3) Upon intercepting the login request message {C i , G i , Q i , P L , N i }, A computes CID i = G i ⊕ h(y j ||N i ) and ID i = CID i ⊕ h(h(x)||N i ).
It is easy to say that A could get the real identity of the user, who sends the login request message {C i , G i , Q i , P L , N i }. Therefore, Shao et al.'s scheme could not provide anonymity.
Conclusion
Recently, Shao et al. [1] proposed a dynamic ID-based remote user authentication scheme with access control for multi-server environment and demonstrated its immunity against various attacks. However, after reviewing their scheme and analyzing its security, two kinds of attacks, i.e., server spoofing attack and password guessing attack, are presented in different scenarios. Moreover, we also demonstrate that Shao et al.'s scheme could not provide anonymity. The analysis shows that their scheme is insecure for practical applications.
